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In this article I examine the ground and 
validity of Peirce’s claim that “belief has no 
place in science”. Contrary to the general 
view, such a claim should not be under-
stood as merely an overreaction to William 
James’ thesis that there can be legitimate 
non-evidential reasons to believe. For 
Peirce, believing that something is the case 
implies, at least when believing takes a cer-
tain form, a kind of dogmatism incompat-
ible with the proper conduct of inquiry 
towards truth. In this paper, I examine two 
ways in which Peirce argues for the “no 
belief in science” thesis. I first discuss ’his 
claim that belief is incompatible with the 
“Will to Learn”. Peirce argues that believing 
that p in such a way that one does not have 
any real doubts about whether p implies 
that one has a dogmatic attitude vis-à-vis 
possible future evidence that not-p; I claim 
that this anticipates the line of reasoning 
that supports Kripke’s “paradox of dogma-
tism”. After having indicated how they can 
both be resisted, I examine a second way—
which seems to have been overlooked in 
Peirce scholarship—in which the founder 
of pragmatism argues for the “no belief in 
science” thesis. Peirce often relates this the-
sis to his view of abduction and the nature 
of explanatory hypotheses: the conclusion 
of an abductive inference is not, and should 
not be, the belief that a given explanatory 
hypothesis H is true, probably true, or 
likely to be true, but rather that H is such 
that it is a possible explanation of fact F.
Keywords: Charles Peirce, Belief, Dogmatism, 
Fallibilism, Abductive Hypotheses, Kripke’s 
Paradox of Dogmatism, Bourdieu’s Theory 0f 
Scientific Fields.
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Charles S. Peirce holds some views about science and inquiry whose 
exact significance and ratio essendi are notoriously hard to grasp. 
One of these is particularly intriguing, namely, his frequently infer-
ring from the intuitive ideas that science consists “in diligent inquiry 
into truth for truth’s sake” (CP 1.44, c.1896), and that the greatest 
threat to science is to “block the way of inquiry” (CP 1.135, RLT 
178, 1898), the conclusions that “belief […] has no place in science” 
and that the “scientific man”, when inquiring, has only “provisional” 
opinions (CP 1.635, RLT 112, 1898). In this article, I examine the 
ground and validity of the infamous and, arguably, strongly coun-
terintuitive thesis that “belief has no place in science”. By so doing, 
I will show that, contrary to what is generally admitted—even by 
many Peirce scholars—such a claim should not be understood merely 
as an overreaction to the views William James advances in The Will 
to Believe (James 1897), where he argues for the legitimacy of non- 
evidential, or practical, reasons to believe. In his writings, Peirce 
defends the “no belief in science” thesis in three ways that are not 
completely unrelated but that nonetheless involve different lines of 
reasoning. What is common to all of them is the idea that believing 
that something is the case involves, at least when belief takes a certain 
form, a kind of dogmatism that is incompatible with the proper con-
duct of inquiry towards truth.
In what follows I present and examine two of these three lines 
of reasoning, and I shall set aside, for reasons of space, the one I 
find least convincing: Peirce’s argument that belief is to be excluded 
from science because true scientists are, as scientists, interested only 
in truth, not in the success of any action, and identify themselves 
with the “unlimited community” of inquiring minds. I first study 
Peirce’s most straightforward way of arguing for the thesis that belief 
has no place in scientific activity: belief is incompatible with the 
“Will to Learn”, because the Will to Learn supposes “a dissatisfac-
tion with one’s present state of opinion” (CP 5.583, RLT 171, 1898) 
that belief, at least when it takes a certain form, excludes (§1). In 
this section, I shall defend two claims: first, I shall argue, follow-
ing Hookway (2000; 2012), that it is hard to understand how the 
practice of inquiry could go on if belief were to be entirely banished 
from science. Second, after indicating why I find it unconvincing to 
defend the plausibility of the “no belief in science” thesis by distin-
guishing two different forms of belief—one that should be excluded 
from science because it goes with dogmatically closing down inquiry 
concerning a given question, and another that is not detrimental 
to the advance of science because it does not go with this—I shall 
argue for the following: we should not accept Peirce’s reasoning that 
believing that p in such a way that one is ready to act upon this belief 
and does not have any real doubts about whether p implies that one 
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has, vis-à-vis possible future evidence that not-p, a dogmatic attitude 
that one would not have if one had not believed that p in such a way. 
The comparison I shall make between Peirce’s line of reasoning on 
this issue and Saul Kripke’s “paradox of dogmatism” (Kripke 2011) 
should make this point clear. 
After that, I shall examine a third way—one that seems to have been 
overlooked in Peirce scholarship—in which the founder of pragmatism 
argues for the “no belief in science” thesis: rather than directly argu-
ing that (a certain form of ) belief dogmatically closes inquiry, Peirce 
often relates his thesis that belief has no place in science to his view of 
abduction and the nature of explanatory hypotheses: the conclusion of 
an abductive inference is not, and should not be, the belief that a given 
explanatory hypothesis H is true, probably true, or likely to be true—
even if, at the same time, H is taken to be a “plausible” explanation of 
some fact F—but rather that H is such that it is a possible explanation 
of F. Accordingly, if, according to Peirce, the belief that H is true has 
no place in science, this does not mean that one should have, vis-à-vis 
the proposition that H is true, a doxastic attitude other than belief, or a 
particular kind of belief, but rather that one should have a belief about 
whether or not H could be true. And I shall indicate why having beliefs 
with such a content is not detrimental to the pursuit of truth—con-
trary to believing that H is true (but for reasons that are distinct from 
those rejected in §1) (§2).
Finally, by relying on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of scientific fields, 
I shall contend that the predominant interest in truth that is, accord-
ing to Peirce, required in order for science to be properly conducted 
does not necessarily imply any “heroism of self-sacrifice” (CP 2.654, W 
3:284, 1878)—by which I mean sacrificing one’s own practical inter-
ests, however personally important they are, to the collective and indef-
inite pursuit of truth (§3).
1.
Peirce’s most straightforward argument for the thesis that belief has no 
place in science is that belief is incompatible with the “Will to Learn” 
because “the first thing that the Will to Learn supposes is a dissatis-
faction with one’s present state of opinion” (CP 5.583, RLT 170-171, 
1898). Now, according to Peirce, this kind of dissatisfaction is intrin-
sically correlated to the state of doubt that belief opposes and paci-
fies. Believing that p leads, for its part, to dismissing as “unserious” the 
possibility that not-p—which leads one who believes that p to close 
her mind to the question of whether or not it is true that p, and so 
to not be in a position to re-examine this question, whatever the facts 
and objections to which one might later be exposed. Now, since such 
an attitude amounts to a form of dogmatism incompatible with the 
advance and progress of inquiry, Peirce concludes that belief should be 
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banished from science. The purpose of this section is to examine this 
line of reasoning.
For Peirce, “it is not knowing, but the love of learning, that charac-
terizes the scientific man”: “If a man burns to learn and sets himself to 
comparing his ideas with experimental results in order that he may cor-
rect those ideas, every scientific man will recognize him as a brother, no 
matter how small his knowledge may be” (CP 1.44, c.1896). In other 
words, for an inquiry to be a real inquiry, or a real scientific inquiry, it 
has to be carried out while being “devoured by a desire to find things 
out” (CP 1.8, c.1897), “to penetrate into the reason of things” (CP 
1.44, c.1896). Now, according to Peirce, this state is impossible when 
one believes that one’s theories or hypotheses are true.
More specifically:
[H]olding for true is of two kinds; the one is that practical holding 
for true which alone is entitled to the name of Belief, while the other 
is that acceptance of a proposition which in the intention of pure 
science remains always provisional. To adhere to a proposition in an 
absolutely definitive manner […] amounts simply to not wishing to 
learn. Now he who does not wish to learn cuts himself off from sci-
ence altogether.
Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order 
to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied 
with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary 
which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of 
philosophy.
Do not block the way of inquiry. (RLT 178, 1898)
So, instead of having beliefs, scientists must provisionally and detachedly 
accept or adopt theories and hypotheses and “struggle […] to see the 
errors” of such pseudo-beliefs (CP 6.3, 1898). According to Peirce, this 
would not be possible if they really believed their hypotheses to be true, 
since if one believes that p, one can have only “paper doubts” about the 
truth of p. Because “the scientific man is above all things desirous of 
learning the truth” and, correlatively, does not lose sight of our inescap-
able fallibility, he cannot, and must not, have real beliefs; he “ardently 
desires to have his present provisional beliefs (and all his beliefs are 
merely provisional) swept away, and will work hard to accomplish that 
object” (ibid.).
In this regard, Peirce writes that “the provisional establishment” of 
“doctrines” or theories in “pure theoretical science” is, “[c]ompared 
with living belief […] nothing but a ghost” (CP 5.60, 1903); that 
holding that a proposition or hypothesis is true is not, in pure science, 
“what is properly and usually called belief, that is, the adoption of a 
proposition as a κτημα ἐσ ἀεί [a possession for all time]” (CP 1.635, 
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RLT 112, 1898); or that scientists only “postulate” or “hope” that 
such-and-such a theory is true—which “does not make it true, nor 
so much as afford the slightest rational motive for yielding it any cre-
dence” (CP 6.39, W 8:113, 1892). The reason why scientists accept a 
hypothesis, write it in “the list of premisses [they] propose… to use” 
(CP 1.635, RLT 112, 1898), or receive it “as a scientific result” (CP 
7.163, 1901), is that “the predictions [deductively]  based upon it 
are verified” by “facts not taken into account in the formation of the 
hypothesis” (ibid.). It is, in other words, “the economy of endeavor 
[that] prescribes that, for the time being, further inquiry shall cease” 
about the hypothesis in question (CP 5.589, RLT 178, 1898). More 
generally, the decision that scientists make to submit certain hypoth-
eses to the verdict of experience—which supposes the provisional 
acceptance of some other hypotheses and experimental procedures—
is grounded on considerations of “economy of research”, not on their 
judging the hypotheses under examination as likely or as “extremely 
probable” (CP 1.120, c.1896); they can even be judged “almost wildly 
incredible” (ibid.).
From this perspective, according to Christopher Hookway, includ-
ing a hypothesis “in the list of ‘established truths’ to be used in formu-
lating new theories and in constructing experiments” does not consist 
for Peirce in believing that hypothesis, but in making a “practical judg-
ment”, and this
involves no commitment to the probable or approximate truth of the 
proposition: ceasing testing this proposition at this stage of inquiry 
will be the best means of making progress eventually towards the 
truth. […] It is now good to treat the world as if this proposition is 
true; but we have no right to believe that it actually is true. (Hookway 
2000: 39)
The problem with this view is that saying that the acceptance of a given 
hypothesis follows from a “practical judgment” relative to consider-
ations about the regulation of the scientific activity seems simply to 
amount to saying that its acceptance follows from a belief about how to 
proceed to attain truth as rapidly as possible, given the hypotheses at 
hand. Why then would the reasons mentioned by Peirce for excluding 
belief from science not apply to such a “practical judgment”? If we 
believe that a given hypothesis should not, for the advance of inquiry, 
be once again put to the test but, on the contrary, be written on the list 
of those upon which we can submit other hypotheses to the verdict of 
experience, the following seems to ensue, according to Peirce’s line of 
reasoning: we cease to wish to learn anything about the role that should 
be given to the hypothesis in question in the regulation of inquiry. But 
then this hypothesis becomes as fixed as if we had directly believed it, 
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since it is on the basis of a belief that it has been written in the list of 
hypotheses that are to be used as premises of scientific inquiry.
It could be objected that the “practical judgments” in question are 
not of the same nature as real beliefs and so are not “extra-scientific” 
(CP 5.589, RLT 177, 1898): they are themselves suppositions, or pro-
visionally accepted hypotheses, relative to the regulation of inquiry. The 
problem with this objection is that even if it is of course possible to 
accept or to suppose that p without considering that p is clearly estab-
lished or supported by the available evidence—i.e., without believing 
that p—it is nonetheless true that this supposition involves, as with 
any supposition, a belief: the belief that making the supposition that 
p is the best thing to do given, among other things, the aim of scien-
tific inquiry, the available evidence, and considerations relative to the 
economy of research. As a consequence, to fill science with supposi-
tions cannot sever it from beliefs; and, conversely, to sever inquiry from 
beliefs comes down to severing it from suppositions.
How, then, should we understand Peirce’s claim that belief has no 
place in science? Hookway envisages the following possibility:
In pure scientific research, we may still ‘act’ on the basis of scientific 
beliefs, by using them in designing experiments or in planning obser-
vations, even if we would not use them as guides to action in con-
nection with practical matters. Laboratory actions are one thing, and 
actions that shape everyday life or matters of personal importance are 
another. How we act depends upon the risks we are ready to take and 
the goals we have. (Hookway 2012:13n)
For Hookway, we can either think that such “scientific beliefs” are 
not real beliefs, because beliefs are habits of action whose scope is not 
restricted to laboratories, or we can think that they are real beliefs but 
deny that beliefs are such habits of action (ibid.:202). The problem is 
that, whichever we choose, the following question remains open: what 
exactly does the doxastic attitude that scientists should have vis-à-vis 
the hypotheses that are involved in their inquiries consist in? By exactly 
what doxastic attitude should belief be replaced in scientific inquiry 
if, as I have just pointed out, it cannot be made of suppositions all the 
way down?
It could be said that the partisan of the “no belief in science” thesis 
does not have to answer this question, because, in actual fact, this thesis 
means neither that belief should be replaced by another kind of dox-
astic attitude (like supposition, or acceptance, for instance), nor that 
any form of belief should be excluded from scientific inquiry. It rather 
means that the type of belief that consists in a full doxastic commitment 
vis-à-vis a given proposition has no place in science because it “impedes 
and discourages honest, fruitful investigation” (Migotti 2005:53); and 
This content downloaded from 128.122.230.148 on Sun, 22 Jan 2017 09:36:23 UTC



























it means that the “provisional, quasi-belief of scientific inquiry” is not 
detrimental to the advance of science because it goes with a thirst for 
truth that leads the scientific believer to recognize that future scien-
tific developments might prompt her to change her views (ibid.:54). 
According to Mark Migotti, “while a scientist ‘ought to be in a double 
state of mind about [a promising] hypothesis, at once ardent in his 
belief that so it must be, and yet not committing himself further than 
to do his best to try the experiment’ ([R] 175), a true believer […] will 
be resolutely single-minded, irrevocably committed to the propositions 
he believes” (ibid.:45–6). This line of thought also appears in the fol-
lowing crucial passage:
[T]here are certain inferences which, scientifically considered, are 
undoubtedly hypotheses and yet which practically are perfectly cer-
tain. Such for instance is the inference that Napoleon Bonaparte 
really lived at about the beginning of this century, a hypothesis which 
we adopt for the purpose of explaining the concordant testimony of a 
hundred memoirs, the public records of history, tradition, and num-
berless monuments and relics. [And yet i]t would surely be downright 
insanity to entertain a doubt about Napoleon’s existence. […] [A]s 
Science progresses […] it is […] entitled to reflect: this ground [that 
is: this scientific conclusion] has held a long time without showing 
signs of yielding. I may hope that it will continue to hold for a great 
while longer. This reflection, however, is […] extra-scientific. For 
Practice, however, it is vitally important [… because] there is now 
reason to believe in the theory, for belief is the willingness to risk a 
great deal upon a proposition. (CP 5.589, RLT 176-177, 1898)
The main difficulty with this position is that it seems to take for granted 
what in fact has to be explained: how an historian can have no real 
doubts at all, just like any other person of sound mind, that Napoleon 
Bonaparte really lived—i.e., how she can believe that this is an estab-
lished truth “to which no competent man today demurs” (CP 1.635, 
RLT 112, 1898)—and, at the same time, believe, as an historian, that this 
is an hypothesis and that future experience might reveal that Napoleon 
did not exist. According to Cheryl Misak, Peirce’s view is that a scien-
tist “ought to be in a double state of mind” because she “must believe, 
but be constantly aware that her belief might be overturned” (Misak 
2004b:162). Her awareness of human fallibility—that is, of the fact that 
every one of our beliefs might be false, and that we might be “compelled 
to deny” tomorrow what we “cannot doubt today”—will not lead her 
to doubt that Napoleon really lived, and it is not a reason for her to 
do so. But its being indubitable for her that Napoleon really lived—in 
Peirce’s terminology, her “substantial” or “practical” certainty that he 
really lived—does not mean that she is “absolutely certain” about it; 
for this would come down to taking her belief that he really lived to be 
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infallible. Thus, her “general sense of human fallibility” (R 329, c.1904, 
cit. in Misak 2004a:55) affects her certainty that Napoleon really lived 
by preventing it from being “absolute” (see Misak 2004a:50–55). In 
short, for Peirce, according to Misak, “[b]elief is not out of place in sci-
ence—it is just tempered by fallibilism” (Misak 2004b:162).
However, it is doubtful that, when it comes to understanding why 
believing that something is the case does not necessarily imply a form 
of dogmatism incompatible with the pursuit of truth, this line of rea-
soning is really satisfactory:
a) if the fact that one’s belief that Napoleon really lived is tempered 
by fallibilism simply consists in its being tempered by one’s awareness 
that the falsity of the belief is a logical, but not serious, possibility;
b) if, as a consequence, this awareness leaves unaffected one’s take on 
whether Napoleon really lived—in other words, if it cannot lead one 
to have any real doubts about whether he really lived;
c) and if it is one’s having no real doubts about whether Napoleon 
really lived that is supposed to have problematic dogmatic conse-
quences for the pursuit of truth;
it follows that: 
d) the fact that one’s belief that Napoleon really lived is tempered 
by fallibilism, in the sense indicated in (a), does not imply that one’s 
belief does not have problematic dogmatic consequences for the pur-
suit of truth.
In order to develop and get a better grasp on this point, let us consider 
the view defended by Migotti (2005). Migotti seems to suggest that 
if one does not really doubt that Napoleon really lived, one cannot 
directly see the question of whether Napoleon really lived as remaining 
open; not doubting that Napoleon really lived means, for him as for 
Peirce, that one takes inquiry to be closed concerning the question at 
issue. But one can indirectly take the question of whether Napoleon 
really lived to remain open. This is because one’s not having real doubts 
about it does not prevent one from believing that, since one is a fallible 
epistemic agent, it is very likely that some of one’s many interconnected 
beliefs about European history are false; and there is no reason why the 
belief that Napoleon really lived, as one of these interconnected beliefs, 
could not be proven to be so by an evolution of one’s system of beliefs 
about European history. But in fact, following this line of thought can-
not really lead one to believe that inquiry is not closed concerning the 
question at issue—assuming that, before following this line of thought, 
one had closed it by (fully) believing that Napoleon really lived. In 
effect, that Napoleon really lived does not cease to be (fully) believed 
by following this line of thought. What one realizes by following it is 
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rather that this belief, like any of one’s interconnected (full) beliefs about 
European history, whatever their content, could turn out to be false, 
because of one’s fallibility. In other words, one’s mind is still completely 
made up about whether Napoleon really lived; it is just that, by ignoring, 
or not focusing on, the content of one’s belief that Napoleon really lived 
and by merely considering this belief as—like all of one’s beliefs—the 
doxastic product of one’s fallible cognitive capacities, one cannot take it 
to be unerringly correct and reliable. But one’s opinion about whether 
Napoleon really lived remains untouched. Now, assuming with Peirce 
that, by (fully) believing that Napoleon really lived, one believes that 
inquiry on this issue is closed, it follows that merely recognizing one’s 
own global fallibility cannot lead one to cease to believe that inquiry is 
closed on whether Napoleon really lived.
It could then be concluded from the foregoing that the only way 
for belief not to be detrimental to inquiry is if believing that p does not 
mean not having real doubts about whether p. But this would come 
down to saying that, for any proposition one could inquire into and 
believe (that is, for any empirical proposition at least), one should never 
dismiss as “unserious” the possibility that the proposition is false. This 
is implausible, and it is certainly not Peirce’s view on beliefs such as the 
one that Napoleon really lived, or that the earth is round.
In the rest of this section, I will show why it is unnecessary to banish 
belief from scientific inquiry in a different—and, in my opinion, more 
convincing—way than Misak and Migotti: there is no reason to adopt 
the “no belief in science” thesis because it is possible to contest from the 
outset Peirce’s inference that if one’s (fully) believing that p involves dis-
regarding as unserious the logical possibility that not-p, then this belief 
leads to dogmatism vis-à-vis the question whether p and thus impairs 
one’s tracking of the truth. Let us start with Isaac Levi’s view that, con-
trary to what Peirce contends, I can, on the one hand, fully believe that 
p and set aside as unserious the possibility that not-p, and, on the other, 
not dismiss as unserious or merely logical the possibility that new pieces 
of evidence might appear in the future that would lead me to truly and 
justifiably believe that it is not the case that p. This is not to say that, 
given the evidence that is now available to me, I can really or seriously 
believe that p might be false; it is to say that I can really believe that I 
might come to correctly believe that p is false on the basis of evidence 
that is not currently available (or on the basis of further reflection on 
the evidence that I now have, and that I now believe to support p). In 
Levi’s words:
X can consistently rule out the logical possibility that there is no ink 
bottle before him as a serious possibility while, at the same time, rec-
ognizing as a serious possibility that future experience may warrant 
X’s withdrawing this judgment. (Levi 2012:229)1
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Levi’s position on this issue is strikingly similar to that of Kripke: 
I may be in no doubt now as to whether there is an ink-bottle in 
front of me and yet it seems to me compatible with this to suppose 
that future evidence could persuade me that there is no ink-bottle. 
There seem to me to be two different questions here: whether I have 
the kind of certainty characterized by there being no doubt now, and 
whether I take the attitude that no future evidence could disprove 
this. (Kripke 2011:42)
And being certain at t1 that there is an ink-bottle before him, not 
merely believing that this is highly probable, also means, according to 
Kripke, that he is “equally certain” at t1 that he will not learn in the 
future that some extraordinary events were taking place at t1 in virtue 
of which that belief was false—for instance, that he was deceived by a 
clever magician (ibid.:41n). Not being certain of this would mean, for 
Kripke, not being certain that there is an ink-bottle before him. At first 
sight, there might seem to be a tension between what Kripke is “equally 
certain” of, and his “suppos[ing] that future evidence could persuade 
[him] that there is no ink-bottle”. But, in fact, supposing this simply 
consists in not excluding the logical possibility that the proposition in 
question could turn out to be false, not in taking this possibility to be, 
in Peircean terms, a serious one.
What may seem more problematic is how being certain that there is 
an ink-bottle before one—and, correlatively, that one will not encoun-
ter in the future evidence to the effect that there was no ink-bottle 
before one—could be of no consequence for one’s doxastic attitude vis-
à-vis evidence of the contrary if one were to encounter some. Peirce’s 
argument that belief has no place in science, that a scientist should not 
be “perfectly cocksure that he knows already”, because, if he believed his 
conclusions, this would prevent him from “stand[ing] ready to aban-
don one or all as soon as experience opposes them” (CP 1.635, c.1896; 
CP 1.55, RLT 112, 1898), remarkably anticipates Kripke’s “paradox 
of dogmatism”. Here is how it can be stated: if one believes that it is 
true that p, one is committed to believing that any evidence against p 
one might encounter would be misleading since it would be evidence 
against something that is true; therefore, if one believes that it is true 
that p, one is committed to believing that any evidence against p one 
might encounter should be disregarded—which is strongly counterin-
tuitive. In Kripke’s words, if one believes that p, “one could conceivably 
resolve that, if one is faced, regardless of whether one wanted it, with 
particular evidence against p, one should nevertheless ignore it” (Kripke 
2011:44). Yet, one “should rationally leave [oneself ] open to chang-
ings-of-mind” due to future evidence, whatever the epistemic status of 
one’s belief that p (ibid.:45).
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The paradox is usually stated in terms of knowledge: if a) one knows 
that p is true, and b) one knows that if p is true then any evidence 
against p one might encounter would be misleading, then c) one knows 
that any evidence against p one might encounter would be misleading. 
This is, as Gilbert Harman puts it, “paradoxical, because I am never in 
a position simply to disregard any future evidence though I do know 
a great many different things” (Harman 1973:148).2 However, when 
the “paradox” is stated in this way and is thus taken to be a paradox of 
knowledge—as Kripke initially states it—it is easy to overlook what 
Kripke himself takes to be his main point: why exactly is it unaccept-
able to make “in advance”, as a consequence of one’s believing that 
it is true that p, the “resolution […] to ignore certain types of evi-
dence” (Kripke 2011:48)? More specifically, why is it unacceptable if 
this resolution directly follows from the conclusion that any evidence 
against p one might encounter would be misleading, which itself seems 
to directly follow from one’s believing that it is true that p? Now, this 
question is not about the conclusion to which one is committed or that 
one is entitled to draw in case one’s belief that p is true or amounts to 
knowledge; it is about the conclusion to which one is committed or 
that one is entitled to draw from one’s believing that it is true, or known, 
that p.3
Kripke’s paradox is that when, given the evidence I have, I believe 
that it is true that p, I am committed to believing that any evidence 
against p I might encounter would be misleading and so should be 
disregarded. So, why should I take the risk of exposing myself to new 
evidence relative to whether p, since, at best, I will not lose something 
I already have: a true belief about whether p? Why should I not form 
the “intention to avoid epistemic harm by closing [my] mind” (Sosa 
2014:80)? What goes wrong in the reasoning that leads to this conclu-
sion is that it implicitly presupposes that, from the triviality that if it is 
the case that p, then all things that could be taken to be evidence that not-p 
are misleading, it follows that if one (fully) believes that it is the case that 
p, then one believes that all things that could be taken to be evidence that 
not-p are misleading. In other words, the reasoning at play in Kripke’s 
paradox implicitly relies on the following inference: from the triviality 
that if it is the case that p, then any evidence that not-p is misleading, it 
follows that if one (fully) believes that it is the case that p, then one (fully) 
believes that any evidence that not-p is misleading. But this inference is by 
no means indisputable. Here is how, in a Peircean spirit, it is possible to 
resist it—and thus, how it is possible to neutralize both Kripke’s para-
dox and Peirce’s claim that if a scientist (fully) believed her conclusions, 
this would lead to a form of dogmatism that would prevent her from 
“stand[ing] ready to abandon one or all as soon as experience opposes 
them”. When, at t1, I (fully) believe, or, alternatively, do not have real 
doubts that, given the evidence I have—i.e., given the things I take to 
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be facts—it is the case that p, I am committed to (fully) believing that 
it won’t be discovered that things are such that, if I took them, now at 
t1, to be part of the evidence I have—i.e., to be facts—I would cease 
to (fully) believe that p. When I (fully) believe that p, I am committed 
to (fully) believing that such things will not be discovered. But believ-
ing this, or being committed to believing it, implies neither a) that I 
believe, or commits me to believing, that such things could not be dis-
covered, nor b) that if such things were discovered, I would be misled 
by them if I were to count them as evidence that not-p and thus cease 
to (fully) believe that p.
In short: to (fully) believe that p is to (fully) believe (or to be com-
mitted to (fully) believing) that evidence that not-p will not be faced; 
it is not to (fully) believe that, logically, physically, or metaphysically, 
this cannot happen. When I (fully) believe that p, I (fully) believe (or 
am committed to fully believing) that it could happen but that it will 
not happen. As such, from one’s (fully) believing that one will not 
be faced with evidence that not-p, one cannot draw any conclusions 
about the attitude one should have vis-à-vis such evidence if this 
were to happen. (Fully) believing that I will not be faced with evi-
dence that not-p is not (or does not commit me to) believing that, if 
this were to happen, I would be misled, contrary to (fully) believing 
that it cannot happen: (fully) believing that it cannot happen is (or 
commits me to) believing that if this were to happen—if I took such 
and such a thing to be evidence that not-p—I would be misled by 
those things.
It therefore appears that (fully) believing that something is the 
case does not imply that one has, vis-à-vis possible future evidence 
that not-p, a dogmatic attitude (that one would not have if one had 
not believed that p) consisting in not standing “ready to abandon 
one or all as soon as experience opposes them” (CP 1.635, RLT 112, 
1898), an attitude one would have if (fully) believing that p implied 
believing that any possible future evidence that not-p would be mis-
leading evidence. In fact, (fully) believing that p given evidence E at 
t1 does not even prevent one from (fully) believing that some new 
non-misleading evidence E* might appear at t2 that would correctly 
lead one to revise one’s belief that p. It is true, however, that (fully) 
believing that p closes one’s inquiry about whether p; as Peirce holds, 
one cannot have no real doubts that p and, at the same time, take the 
question of whether p to remain open. But this is not really detri-
mental to one’s personally tracking the truth, or to scientific inquiry, 
because of a) one’s being constantly exposed to new evidence, and 
b) the high interconnectedness of beliefs—and of scientific ones in 
particular. Indeed, even if, apropos anything one (fully) believes to 
be the case, one takes inquiry to be closed on the matter at issue, this 
does not prevent one—as we have just seen—from changing beliefs 
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when faced with counterevidence that one (fully) believed one would 
not face. Moreover, one’s ceasing to inquire into whether p as soon as 
one (fully) believes that p will not stop one from going on to inquire 
into related issues and trying to obtain evidence enabling one to elu-
cidate them; and this will often result in the acquisition of evidence 
(at least partly) relevant to the issue of whether p—which might well 
be evidence that not-p.
In order to be entitled to claim that (full) beliefs are fundamen-
tally detrimental to the advance of science toward truth, Peirce needs to 
show that they tend to be irremovable, not subject to being abandoned 
“as soon as experience opposes them” (ibid.), and that the only func-
tion they allow empirical data to play is, not guiding (and, possibly, 
refuting), but confirming them. But the argument that one’s (fully) 
believing that p leads one to be insensitive to any evidence that not-p 
one could be faced with, because (fully) believing that p commits one 
to disregarding such evidence as misleading, is unsatisfactory and thus 
does not succeed in showing that beliefs naturally tend to be irremov-
able. In other words, it does not succeed in establishing that believing 
that p given evidence E prevents one from doubting that p when one 
is faced with new evidence E*—where E* would lead rational individ-
uals who have not previously formed the belief that p to believe that 
not-p given E*. Therefore, this argument, which is also at the center of 
Kripke’s paradox, cannot rationally ground the “no belief in science” 
thesis.
2.
I will now examine a second way—that, as far as I know, has been 
overlooked in Peirce scholarship—in which the founder of pragmatism 
argues for the “no belief in science” thesis: rather than directly arguing 
that belief dogmatically closes inquiry, Peirce often relates his thesis 
that belief has no place in science to his view of abduction and the 
nature of explanatory hypotheses.
Let us begin with one of Peirce’s last, and more enlightening, defini-
tions of retroduction:
By Retroduction I mean that kind of reasoning by which, upon find-
ing ourselves confronted by a state of things that, taken by itself, 
seems almost or quite incomprehensible, or extremely complicated 
if not very irregular, or at least surprising, we are led to suppose that 
perhaps there is, in fact, another definite state of things, because, 
though we do not perceive any unequivocal evidence of it, nor even 
of a part of it (or independently of such evidence if it does exist), we 
yet perceive that this supposed state of things would shed a light of 
reason upon the state of facts with which we are confronted, render-
ing it comprehensible, likely (if not certain), or comparatively simple 
and natural. (R 856:3-4)4
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In a retroductive inference like “the surprising fact, C, is observed; 
but if A were true, C would be a matter of course” (CP 5.189, 1903), 
one can only infer “that a certain state of things may be true” (NEM 
3:204, 1911). The ground of this inference is that one “either fully 
perceives or more or less suspects that the perplexing phenomenon 
would be a necessary or quite probable5 consequence” (CP 8.229, 
c.1910) of the possible state of affairs A (or H). “There is no proba-
bility about it [H]. It is a mere suggestion which we tentatively adopt 
[…] for the sake of its explanation of known facts.” (RLT 142, 1898) 
It “is something which looks as if it might be true and were true” (CP 
1.120, c.1896).
On account of this [possible] Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard 
his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favor. As I phrase it, he provision-
ally holds it to be “Plausible” […]. The whole series of mental per-
formances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the 
acceptance of the hypothesis, […] the remarking of its smooth fitting 
to the anomaly, as it is turned back and forth like a key in a lock, and 
the final estimation of its Plausibility […], I term Retroduction […].
[But r]etroduction does not afford security. The hypothesis must be 
tested. (CP 6.469, 1908)
It is important here to note that the “plausibility” of H, as it has been 
defined, does not mean that H is true, probably true, or likely to be 
true. Contrary to what Peirce sometimes suggests, its plausibility—
due to its being perceived as being such that it could explain F (either 
immediately, or after “the remarking of its smooth fitting to the anom-
aly, as it is turned back and forth like a key in a lock”)—is not even 
a “reason to suspect that [H] is true” (CP 5.189, 1903). H is “plausi-
ble”, or regarded “with favor”, only in the sense that H is seen (either 
immediately, or after having reflected on it very carefully) as being a 
possible explanation of F. Such a “plausibility” is “sufficient to warrant 
further examination” of H (NEM 3:204, 1911)—that is, to send it off 
to experimental trial.
However, Peirce also writes that its plausibility constitutes “a reason 
for accepting the Retroductive conclusion” because “man must trust to 
his power of getting at the truth” (ibid). How can we understand such 
an idea from the perspective I have indicated? And how can we under-
stand the related idea—which Peirce claims on many occasions—that 
one simply wouldn’t endeavor to devise and to examine explanatory 
hypotheses if one did not hope to be able to find the right explanation 
of F? Isn’t this incompatible with the idea that when H is judged or 
perceived to be such that it could be the right explanation of F, this 
does not amount to a reason to suspect that H is true—i.e., that H is 
the right explanation of F?
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There is no incompatibility. The fact that “man must trust to his 
power of getting at the truth” (“simply because it is all he has to guide 
him”, Peirce adds) simply means that one must trust one’s judgment 
that H is such that it is a possible explanation of F; or, equivalently, that 
one must consider one’s judgment a reliable guide to truth about the 
question of whether H could be the right explanation of F. This does 
not mean that because one judges that H is such that it is a possible 
explanation of F, one does or has to judge that H is actually the right 
explanation of F—i.e., that H is true—or even to suspect that it is. And 
it is perfectly possible for one to hope that H is the right explanation of 
F without judging or suspecting that it is. More specifically, since one 
has to “trust [one’s] power of getting at the truth”, one’s perceiving H 
as being a possible explanation of F entitles one to hope that H is the 
right explanation of F, which would not be the case if one had judged 
that H was not a possible explanation of F.
Two related issues then arise. 1) Does deciding to send H off to 
experimental trial necessarily imply wanting to know whether H is the 
right explanation of F (and not just whether H could be the right expla-
nation of F)? Is this the raison d’être of putting H to test? 2) Is the only 
thing we can learn from sending H off to experimental trial the proba-
bility of H’s being the right explanation of F? 
As I have already underlined, for Peirce “retroduction does not 
afford security” (CP 6.469, 1908). “There is no probability about [H]. 
It is a mere suggestion which we tentatively adopt […] for the sake 
of its explanation of known facts” (RLT 142, 1898). “It is something 
which looks as if it might be true and were true” (CP 1.120, c.1896). 
So when Peirce adds that “the [plausible] hypothesis must be tested” 
(CP 6.469, 1908), the reader might naturally be tempted to think that 
H should be tested with the objective of determining how probable it 
is that H is true—i.e., how probable it is that H is the right explanation 
of F. However, this cannot be Peirce’s view about the scientific role of 
experimental trials, since he writes in a decisive passage part of which I 
have already quoted:
As Science progresses [… one] is entitled to reflect: this ground [that 
is: this “scientific conclusion”] has held a long time without show-
ing signs of yielding. I may hope that it will continue to hold for a 
great while longer. This reflection, however, is […] extra-scientific. 
[…] As Practice apprehends it, the conclusion no longer rests upon 
mere retroduction, it is inductively supported. For a large sample has 
now been drawn from the entire collection of occasions in which 
the theory comes into comparison with fact, and an overwhelming 
proportion, in fact all the cases that have presented themselves, have 
been found to bear out the theory. And so, says Practice, I can safely 
presume that so it will be with the great bulk of the cases in which 
I shall go upon the theory; especially as they will closely resemble 
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those which have been well tried. In other words there is now reason 
to believe in the theory […]. But this belief is no concern of science 
[…]. Those retroductive inferences which at length acquire such high 
degrees of certainty, so far as they are so probable are not pure retro-
ductions and do not belong to science, as such, while so far as they 
are scientific and are pure retroductions, have no true probability and 
are not matters for belief. We call them in science established truths, 
that is, they are propositions into which the economy of endeavor 
prescribes that for the time being further inquiry shall cease. (CP 
5.589, RLT 177-178)
Why, then, from a purely scientific point of view, might a scientist want 
to test a “plausible” explanatory hypothesis? What could be learned 
from an experimental trial, and only from an experimental trial, about 
the question of whether the hypothesis tested is a good one, but, at the 
same time, not about its being (probably) true or not?
To this question, the Peircean answer is rather simple: one is in a 
position to learn from the experimental testing of H whether one was 
wrong in thinking that H is such that it could be the right explanation 
of F. If H does not pass the test of experience, then (supposing one 
admits the verdict of experience) H cannot be a possible explanation of 
F and so has to be rejected. This point appears most clearly when Peirce 
writes that abduction is reasoning of the following form:
If A is true, C {is not/is} true
But C {is not/ is} true
Therefore, Is A not true?
Instead of “interrogatory”, the mood of the conclusion might more 
accurately be called “investigand”, and be expressed as follows: “It is 
to be inquired whether A is not true.” (L 463, 1905)6
The imperative element of the conclusion of an abductive inference (“It 
is to be inquired whether…”) is related to the idea that “man must trust 
to his power of getting at the truth” (my emphasis)—i.e., one must 
trust one’s judgment that H is such that it is a possible explanation 
of F—so that H deserves to be put to the test. This is why, as Bellucci 
and Pietarinen remark, an abductive inference does not simply “pres-
ent a given hypothesis for contemplation” (2015:357). The negative 
element of the conclusion (“…whether A is not true” (my emphasis)) 
makes it clear that the role of experimental testing is not to decide 
whether the hypothesis in question is (probably) true but to determine 
whether it really is a possible explanation of F. Its being rejected by 
experience would condemn H as not being a possible explanation. That 
the focus of an abductive inference is on possibility, and that inquiring, 
by means of experimental testing, into whether H is false is not just a 
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way, in Peirce’s view, of inquiring into whether H is true, is also visible in 
another aspect of the conclusion of such an inference: its being interrog-
ative. From a Peircean point of view, the main problem with expressing 
the conclusion of an abductive inference by “Is A not true?” is not the 
interrogative mood (which explicitly indicates that the conclusion is 
about whether H is a possible explanation of F), but the fact that, so 
expressed, it does not contain the imperative element that explicitly 
appears in “It is to be inquired whether A is not true”.
When H (“A”) is tested and not judged to be refuted by experi-
ence, one can draw from each experimental trial the conclusion that 
H remains a possible explanation of F (“C”)—in other words, remains 
“plausible”, or such that it could be true. In this regard, the experi-
mental testing of H fulfils a similar function as noticing H’s “smooth 
fitting to the anomaly, as it is turned back and forth like a key in a 
lock”. The difference is that H can be considered, after having survived 
the test of experience, a “scientific result” (CP 7.163, 1901),7 because, 
when asked (so to speak), the world did not object to the scientist’s 
judgement that H was “plausible”. She is then entitled to rely on H in 
her scientific activity in general and in her retroductive reasonings in 
particular.
More specifically, even though she was already entitled, before put-
ting H to the test, to regard her judgment as a reliable guide to truth 
about the question of whether H could be the right explanation of F, 
the world is put, by H itself, in the role of arbiter about the possibility 
of H as an explanation of F. That is so because if H is a properly con-
ceived explanatory hypothesis, part of its content consists in specifying 
that if a certain kind of event E were not the case in a certain kind of 
circumstance C, this would be incompatible with H’s being the case. 
Thus, a central part of putting H to the test can be characterized as 
endeavoring to bring about C (or conditions relevantly similar to C) 
and observing whether or not E (or something relevantly similar to E) 
happens.  
It is important to note that this is not to say that H is more “plausi-
ble”, in Peirce’s sense, after having survived the test: it cannot be more 
or less the case that H is such that it could explain F—either H con-
stitutes a possible explanation of F or it does not. One may be unsure, 
or have no clear view about the issue, but H cannot become a better 
explanation of F in virtue of its having survived the test of experience.8 
After having failed to pass such a test, it appears that H simply cannot 
be a possible explanation of F (supposing that the verdict of experience 
is admitted). If it does not make sense to say that H is more plausi-
ble after having survived the test of experience, is it nevertheless pos-
sible to claim that, after having survived it, it is more likely that H is 
a possible explanation of F? It is possible to claim this, but only in the 
sense that the world did not prove wrong—on the basis of conditional 
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expectations that are part of the content of H—the retroductive infer-
ence that H is a possible explanation of F. And a critical point is that 
judgments about whether or not H is a possible explanation of F (or 
about how likely or probable it is that H is so) are not judgments about 
whether or not H is the right explanation of F (or about how likely or 
probable it is that H is so). Correlatively, believing that H is such that it 
could be the right explanation of F clearly does not entail believing that 
H is the right explanation of F. It does not even entail supposing such a 
thing. Crucially, believing that H is such that it could be the right expla-
nation should not be confused with supposing or guessing that H is the 
right explanation.
If H “is inductively supported” by its not having been refuted by 
experience on many occasions, one is perfectly “entitled” (CP 5.589, 
RLT 177, 1898), says Peirce, to draw the conclusion that H (prob-
ably) is the right explanation of F—that is, entitled to believe (that 
it is probable) that H actually explains F. Correlatively, one is then 
entitled to base one’s actions on H. Nevertheless, this conclusion is 
for Peirce “extra-scientific”, because scientific inquiry consists only of 
inferences and conclusions about whether a certain hypothesis could 
be the right explanation of F. Even if hoping to find the truth about 
the question of whether H (or H*, or H**, etc.) is the right expla-
nation of F is constitutive of scientific inquiry, this does not imply 
that scientific inquiry cannot but consist, at certain times at least, of 
inferences and conclusions about whether a certain hypothesis is the 
right explanation of F: eliminating “plausible” possible explanations 
of F is the proper way of endeavoring to find out the only possible 
explanation of F—which, if successful, is nothing but having found 
the right explanation of F.9  
It might be objected that if the core of Peirce’s view about the sci-
entific attitude one should adopt towards explanatory hypotheses is as 
I have described, it does not follow—quite the contrary, in fact—that 
belief has no place in science, against what Peirce repeatedly claims: 
after all, if my interpretation is correct, one is allowed, even as a sci-
entist, to judge or believe (before or after having sent it to experimen-
tal trial) that H is such that it could be the right explanation of F. In 
other words, the attitude scientists should take towards an explanatory 
hypothesis H does not consist in having an alternative kind of doxastic 
attitude to belief vis-à-vis the question of whether H is true or probably 
true—something weaker, more detached, like acceptance or supposi-
tion, for instance. It rather consists in wondering whether H is such 
that it could be true—that is, whether it could be the right explanation 
of F—and then in believing that H could be so, or could not be so. 
What directly concerns the “no belief in science” thesis is that because 
believing that H could be the right explanation of F does not exclude 
in any way believing that there may be other possible explanations of F, 
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such a belief does not block the path of inquiry; unlike believing that 
H is the right explanation of F, which fixes H and prevents one from 
reconsidering H in the light of new evidence (by following the Peircean 
line of thought I criticized in §1). Therefore, while importing into sci-
entific inquiry (legitimate, because inductively supported) beliefs about 
whether or not (it is probable that) H is the right explanation of F 
would, on Peirce’s view, be detrimental to the progress of inquiry, there 
is no reason to be particularly worried by one’s believing that H is such 
that it could be true—even if his disputable view of belief is endorsed. 
Accordingly, to be a good “man of science” is thus for Peirce to be able 
to sift out, when it comes to the conclusions one is entitled to draw 
from experimental trials, those that are irrelevant to, and harmful for, 
scientific inquiry—i.e., conclusions about whether (it is probable that) 
H is the right explanation of F; and those are not—i.e., conclusions 
about whether H could be the right explanation of F.10
One might object that believing that H is such that it could be the 
right explanation of F also excludes, in reality, the possibility of H’s 
being false. Indeed, if H is false, then (trivially) H cannot be the right 
explanation of F. Therefore, so the objection goes, believing that H is 
such that it could be the right explanation of F requires believing that 
if the results of experimental testing of H were found to be contrary to 
H, this would not amount to a reason to reject H. Worse still, having 
the belief in question implies believing that there is no point putting 
H to the test—which is patently absurd. However this objection can 
be easily resisted: believing that H is such that it could be the right 
explanation of F consists in believing that the theories and empirical 
evidence at hand are not incompatible with H’s explaining F; more 
precisely, it consists in believing that they are not incompatible 1) with 
the explanans indicated by H being the case, and 2) with the idea that 
if H were true, then F would (probably or necessarily) follow. And this 
does not require—even on Peirce’s disputable view of belief—ruling out 
that, in the future, some new evidence might prove incompatible with 
H’s being a possible explanation of F.
Now, supposing that the arguments I advanced in §1 against Peirce’s 
view of (full) belief as intrinsically dogmatic are correct, is there still a 
reason why it could be better for the advance of science to believe that 
(and to inquire into whether) H is such that it could explain F, rather 
than to believe that (and to inquire into whether) H is the right expla-
nation of H? There is one: if it is admitted that beliefs, once formed, 
have the nature of habits, and that habits naturally tend to persevere in 
their being (to put it in Spinozian terms), it follows that beliefs naturally 
tend to be irrationally partly insensitive to future counterevidence, or, 
at least, not sensitive enough to it. This is not to say, contrary to Peirce 
on many occasions, that believing that p implies believing that any 
(pseudo-)evidence that not-p is misleading evidence, an unwillingness 
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to learn, or a lack of “ethics of fairness and impartiality” “indissolubly 
bound up” with “the logic which observational science uses”—an ethics 
that leads real scientists “to try to see the errors of [their] beliefs”, and 
not to try “to confirm themselves in early beliefs” (CP 6.3, 1898). This 
is rather to say that being a habit, which, as such, naturally tends to 
persevere in its being, one’s believing that p causally leads one not to 
take into account future evidence that not-p in the way those who do 
not have any belief about whether p or not-p would. If this is correct, it 
is easy to see why it is better for the pursuit of truth to believe that H 
could explain F, rather than to believe that H is the right explanation of 
H: the inertial resistance of the former belief to counterevidence does 
not affect one’s envisaging other explanations of F (but only tends to 
prevent one from admitting that H cannot be a possible explanation of 
F), while that of the latter directly affects it.
3.
If it is admitted, rather uncontroversially, that a) the practical inter-
ests a scientist may have in believing that p, interests thesatisfaction of 
which is independent of whether it is true that p, can causally lead her 
to believe that p in cases in which, did she not have these interests, she 
would not have taken the evidence to (clearly) support that p; and that 
b) this impedes the advance of science towards truth, the following 
ensues: we would have a scientific field composed of scientists who 
care more about truth than about their own fate, whose predominant 
aim would be to be “on the path to objective truth” (CP 5.589) (and 
who, in this sense, would identify themselves with the scientific com-
munity), and who would permit inquiry to progress in an ideal way 
towards truth. This would be the case not because such an attitude 
would prevent these scientists from forming beliefs, but because this atti-
tude would not prevent their beliefs from tracking the truth. In this final 
section, I want to examine why the predominant interest in truth that 
is required for science to be properly or ideally conducted does not 
necessarily imply, contrary to what Peirce seems to think, any “hero-
ism of self-sacrifice”—by which I mean sacrificing one’s own practical 
interests, however personally important they are, to the collective and 
indefinite pursuit of truth.
For Peirce, the scientific world is as it should be when it is “like a 
colony of insects, in that the individual strives to produce that which 
he himself cannot hope to enjoy” (CP 7.87, 1902): a scientist “does not 
expect to learn, in this life, what conclusion it is to which his labors are 
tending” (CP 7.185, 1901), because the scientific pursuit of truth is not 
“the work of one man’s life, but as that of generation after generation, 
indefinitely” (CP 5.589, RLT 177, 1898). Correlatively, for Peirce, a 
scientist should not attribute any weight to the devastating personal 
consequences—in terms of career, recognition, self-esteem, etc.—of 
This content downloaded from 128.122.230.148 on Sun, 22 Jan 2017 09:36:23 UTC



























the falsity of a theory or hypothesis she has elaborated and to which she 
has devoted her life. She should stand ready to abandon this hypothesis 
in the light of new evidence to the same extent as any other scientist for 
whom its truth or falsity is of no personal practical importance, which 
means that she should stand ready to sacrifice her personal practical 
interests to the conquest of truth and should even “ardently desire” to 
do so (CP 6.3, 1898) when, in the presence of counterevidence to her 
personally consequential hypothesis, she is given the opportunity to 
make a step towards truth by abandoning it (see Migotti 2005:51–52). 
However, by relying on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of scientific fields, I 
would like to show that, when truth functions as an operative and reg-
ulative norm of scientific fields, a scientist’s personal practical interests 
can, without any personal sacrifices being made, be identified with those 
of the scientific community and thus not be detrimental to the advance 
of science toward truth.
According to Bourdieu:
We must resign ourselves to admitting that, short of demanding of 
everyone at every moment the extraordinary dispositions of the saint, 
the genius, or the hero, one can obtain ordinary reason or virtue only 
from a social order capable of making these into a specific form of 
well-understood self-interest. (Bourdieu 1991:22)
One does not find scientific salvation alone. Just as one is not an 
artist alone, but by participating in the artistic field, likewise we can 
say that it is the scientific field which makes scientific reason possible 
through its very functioning. (Bourdieu 1992:189)
For Bourdieu, scientific fields have to be organized in such a way that 
what they impose on and offer as a reward to their members turns 
out to coincide with what ideal scientists, “capable of the heroism of 
self-sacrifice” (in the sense indicated above) and entirely devoted to 
the conquest of truth, would impose upon themselves. More specifi-
cally, the scientific fields have to be organized in such a way that sci-
entists whose personal practical interests would have prevented them, 
in badly-regulated scientific fields, from forming and rectifying certain 
beliefs (when confronted with evidence that rationally requires them 
to do so) are, on the contrary, spontaneously inclined to do so; this 
is because, in such fields, that is how their personal interests are best 
served.
It is important here to underline that, as members of (ideally) 
well-regulated scientific fields, scientists do not conduct their inquiries 
in this virtuous fashion because they have the intention of satisfying 
their personal practical interests: in such fields, they sincerely and genu-
inely care about the truth and rationality of their beliefs—they consider 
rationality to be the norm of their inquiries, and truth to be their goal. 
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Bourdieu’s central point is that this is so only because, in such fields, 
their personal interests are served only by conducting their inquiries 
in the way Peircean scientific heroes would conduct them—that is, by 
valuing disinterested truth more than anything else. To put it another 
way, according to Bourdieu, if reason and the universal “advance at all, 
it is probably because there are profits in rationality and universality, 
and that actions which advance reason and the universal advance at the 
same time the interests of those who perform them” (Bourdieu 2000 
[1997]:126).
One of the main reasons that well-regulated scientific fields are able 
to foster truth and rationality and weaken “the ordinary antinomies 
between interest and reason, force and truth, etc.” (Bourdieu 2004 
[2001]:82) is, according to Bourdieu, their autonomy, that is, their clo-
sure upon themselves:
As the collectively accumulated scientific resources increase and, 
correlatively, the requirements for entry into the field are raised, de 
jure or de facto excluding aspirants who lack the necessary compe-
tence to compete effectively, the agents and institutions engaged in 
the competition tend ever more to have only the most formidable of 
their competitors for potential addressees or ‘clients’. Their validity 
claims are forced to confront competing claims, also scientifically 
armed, to obtain recognition; the only chance for the authors of dis-
coveries to be understood and recognized is by those of their peers 
who are both most competent and least prone towards indulgent 
complicities and therefore most inclined and qualified to engage 
the specific resources accumulated throughout the whole history 
of the field in a critique of these discoveries tending to advance 
reason through the power of refutations, corrections and additions. 
(Bourdieu 2000 [1997]:112)
I want to make two remarks about this idea. First, Robert K. Merton’s 
ethos of science—“that affectively toned complex of values and 
norms which is held to be binding on the man of science”, and that 
comprises four “institutional imperatives”: “universalism, ‘commu-
nism’, disinterestedness, and organized scepticism” (Merton 1973 
[1942]:268-70)—strikingly echoes the “logical socialism” of Peirce’s 
ethics of science:
Science is to mean for us a mode of life whose single animating pur-
pose is to find out the real truth […] and which seeks coöperation 
in the hope that the truth may be found, if not by any of the actual 
inquirers, yet ultimately by those who come after them and who shall 
make use of their results. (CP 7.54, c.1902)
The method of modern science is social in respect to the solidarity of 
its efforts. (CP 7.87, 1902)
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Second, for Merton, just as for Bourdieu, scientific ethos and sci-
entific autonomy are “intimately intertwined” and “mutually rein-
forcing”, as Aaron Panofsky has recently underlined. For Merton, 
“the freer a scientific community from extrascientific influence, the 
stronger its institutionalization of the ethos; and the stronger the 
collective commitment to elements of the scientific ethos, the less 
vulnerable they would be to extrascientific influences” (Panofsky 
2010:141).
Nevertheless, there is for Bourdieu a certain sociological naiveté in 
Merton’s conception of the normative power exerted by the ethos of 
science on members of the scientific community, which seems similar, 
for Merton, to that of a set of half-internalized, morally respectable 
rules of scientific etiquette. What is sociologically crucial for Bourdieu 
is that we understand the social principle of “the alchemy that trans-
mutes the appetite for recognition into an interest for knowledge” of 
the purest kind; a social principle that, as a result, “enables scientific 
reason […] to move progressively towards total independence from 
constraints and contingencies, a kind of focus imaginarius to which the 
rationalist conviction aspires and by which it is measured” (Bourdieu 
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NOTES
1. See also: “X can coherently fully believe that h (be absolutely certain that 
h is true, have no doubt as to the truth of h, rule out any serious possibility that 
h is false) while recognizing the serious possibility that X might change X’s mind 
at some future stage of inquiry, reflection, or deliberation and do so with good 
reason. X’s commitment to the epistemic infallibility of X’s full beliefs coheres 
This content downloaded from 128.122.230.148 on Sun, 22 Jan 2017 09:36:23 UTC



























perfectly well with X’s recognition of the revisability or corrigibility of X’s full 
beliefs.” (Levi 2012:120)
2. John Hawthorne’s variant of this paradox is as follows: “Suppose there are 
two newspapers, The Times and The Guardian, which I trust equally well for the 
purposes of obtaining soccer information. With good reason: both are extremely 
reliable in their reporting of soccer results. I look in The Times and find a Man-
chester United victory reported. I trust the report. The report is in fact correct. 
Under such circumstances people are inclined to say I know both that The Times 
said that Manchester United won and also that Manchester United won. Let us 
suppose I also know that The Guardian will have reported a result for the Man-
chester United game. I deduce that either The Times and The Guardian correctly 
reported a Manchester United victory or else The Guardian made a mistake about 
the Manchester United result. Suppose, in fact that, unbeknownst to me, The 
Guardian did make such a mistake. People are not inclined to say I know the 
above disjunction” (Hawthorne 2004: 71).
3. This is why, as Kripke remarks, Harman’s answer to the paradox does not 
address its main point. Harman’s answer is that if one were to encounter evidence 
that not-p at t2 one would not know at t2 that this evidence is misleading and, as 
such, to be disregarded. This is so because even if one knew at t1 that p and, as a 
consequence (according to Harman), that any evidence that not-p is misleading, 
the latter thing would no longer be known at t2, because, at t2, it would no longer 
be known that p, due to one’s knowledge that p being undermined at t2 by the 
evidence encountered at t2 (see Harman 1973:148–149).
4. Peirce calls this kind of reasoning “retroduction”, “because it starts at con-
sequents and recedes to a conjectural antecedent from which these consequents 
would, or might very likely logically follow” (R 905, 1908).
5. If this is so, it is not the case that all retroductive inference consists for Peirce 
in “a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily following from the cir-
cumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the conjecture as premises” 
(R 843:41, my emphasis). 
6. I owe this quote to Bellucci and Pietarinen (2015).
7. “If the facts refute the hypothesis, it must be abandoned and another sub-
stituted; but if the predictions based upon it are verified, it will be entitled to be 
received as a scientific result until we find deductions from it which are contrary 
to the facts.” (CP 7.163, 1901)
8. Correlatively, as Peirce remarks, the fact that H would explain F if H 
were true is something that cannot have any probability: it makes no sense 
to say that it is probable that if H is true, then F is “a matter of course” (CP 
5.189, 1903).
9. It could be argued that the interpretation of Peirce I defend in this paper 
makes his view of the nature of explanatory hypotheses and the role of experimen-
tal testing very close to Popper’s, and, consequently, that it faces the same difficul-
ties. I cannot discuss this point in detail here; I shall simply remark that a crucial 
difference between the two philosophers is that Peirce’s view does not entail in any 
way the very problematic claim that induction has no real place in the logic of 
science. His view merely entails that because the process of scientific explanation 
does not involve or require believing that such and such an explanatory hypoth-
esis is true, and because it is on the basis of induction that we can be justified in 
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forming such beliefs, it follows that induction does not play a role in the process 
of scientific explanation that it is ordinarily thought to play.
10. This is how the following passage can be understood without our being 
compelled to posit an implausible (if not impossible) twofold cognitive attitude 
vis-à-vis the same propositions: “[T]here are certain inferences which, scientifi-
cally considered, are undoubtedly hypotheses [and so have no true probability] 
and yet which practically are perfectly certain [because they are “inductively sup-
ported”, and so have acquired “high degrees of certainty”]. Such for instance is 
the inference that Napoleon Bonaparte really lived at about the beginning of this 
century, a hypothesis which we adopt for the purpose of explaining the concor-
dant testimony of a hundred memoirs, the public records of history, tradition, 
and numberless monuments and relics. [And yet] it would surely be downright 
insanity to entertain a doubt about Napoleon’s existence” (CP 5.589, RLT 176, 
1898). 
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